In this speech, delivered to the Meeting of the Experts Group on Disclosure of Non-Financial Information by Companies, Dr. Steve Waygood discusses the need for greater levels, and uniformity, of discloure by companies on non-financial issues in order to better ensure long-term, sustainable, value creation for both investors and their investee companies. Dr. Waygood goes on to address four key questions regarding how and why to proceed with this aim, and sets out Aviva Investors' position.

In 2002 Mark Goyder wrote "Lessons from Enron". It was a story about the culture of fear and greed at the top of the company, and how Enron's non-execs, who were there to hold them to account, failed to restrain it.  In this article Mark looks at the similarities between Enron's corporate culture and that of News Corp, in the light of recent events. He asks what lessons can be learned from these failings and spells out the need for a greater measure of stewardship throughout the investment chain.  

I've listened carefully to the discussions of the past two days and tried to formulate these remarks as late as possible. Let me suggest four concrete action points which reflect Commissioner Andor's commitment to what he called 'a new and modern EU CSR policy framework'.

Crises are normal and of all times: they are always generally unexpected, with the next one quite different from the previous one (as we have put the breaks and stress-tests in place to prevent the previous one from occurring again), and more difficult to contain, manage and resolve. What the current crisis has taught us is how interdependent the world has become;

 The 2007-2009 financial crisis was a perfect "black swan" event: unexpected, a rarity, with broad and deep impacts; and, with the benefit of hindsight, it was also retrospectively rationalised by many "experts". We got it all "sensationally" wrong: bankers (like myself), policy-makers, supervisors, auditors, research analysts, economists, civil society itself. And even as the crisis was unfolding, many initially did not consider its seriousness. We saw dangers of shocks, but underestimated the confluence and impact thereof.