The paper proposes a framework to help organizations monitor levels of trust for different stakeholder groups.  Part I, contained in a separate document, examined various trust indicators to measure the relative presence or absence of trust, and the nature of that trust, in typical commercial relationships.  It also introduced new trust concepts and proposed a novel framework for classifying conditions that indicate trust.  Part II builds on these foundations and examines trust indicators for investors.  Examples are used to demonstrate various ways the framework can be applied to measure trust indicators for investors with distinct needs.

This paper introduces the Trust Enablement™ approach to corporate governance, as a natural and harmonizing counterbalance to prevailing risk management practices.Recent attempts to restore confidence in capital markets have been based largely on risk management practices that place greater emphasis on protecting organizations from further erosion of trust than on establishing higher levels of trust and confidence. Efforts focused on proactively building trust yield better results than recent risk management reactions to mistrust.  A complementary, offensive trust and confidence-building strategy is therefore proposed as more effective for reducing director and officer liability exposures and enhancing business value than a prevailing defensive, risk management strategy.Comparative examples of current governance practices and proposed initiatives when mapped to the Trust Enablement™ model reveal a deficiency in trust and confidence-building governance mechanisms.  Trust Enablement™,...

This Tomorrow’s Company report seeks to understand the link between innovation and the effective management of risk. The price of poor governance has been increasingly evident through the credit crunch and recession. The report in particular considers the relationship between innovation and difference or 'diversity' on the board;  the effectiveness and role of non-executive directors, and the impact of the criteria of independence; the relationship between innovation and risk; and the impact of quality of leadership - 'the tone from the top'. 

In the UK, the US and many other countries, existing board election processes mean shareholders rely almost entirely on existing board members to identify board candidates. In the vast majority of cases, shareholders have no real say over who is chosen to represent their interests and those of the company they own. Board nomination committees are sub-committees of the board itself. Over the last 10 years, Sweden has moved away from such a system. This report examines the Swedish experience of shareholders taking this key governance function into their own hands. The report also considers lessons that can be drawn for governance in the UK and other countries with dispersed shareholdings.  It  concludes with an agenda for action by listed companies, institutional investors, the Institutional Shareholders Committee  and the Financial Reporting Council. 

Unpicking the Corporate Responsibility Debate.